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22 February 1963

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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USSR--Nuclear Test Ban: [The initial reaction of Soviet officials in Geneva to the new US proposal for a nuclear test ban has been negative.]

[The new US proposal, which includes a willingness to reduce the number of on-site inspections to seven if the USSR accepts the technical arrangements contained in the plan, was outlined to First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov on 19 February. Kuznetsov replied that "only that morning" Khrushchev had telephoned him instructions that no agreements on details were to be given until the Western side accepted the Soviet figure of "not over three" inspections.]

[Kuznetsov, although indicating his "personal disappointment" that the new US offer "appeared to make agreement impossible," promised to transmit it to Moscow.]

[In a conversation of 20 February with a US official, Soviet delegate Mendelevich appeared to imply that Moscow was prepared to move beyond three inspections. He discounted, however, the US offer of seven, noting that it would have a "very adverse effect" in Moscow. He attempted to justify this remark by pointing out that such bargaining was "not worthy of great countries" and reflected "provincialism" in US foreign policy.]

## Communist China:

[redacted] there is no question in the minds of the Soviets [redacted] that the Chinese can explode a nuclear device.]

The Soviets believe that the first test explosion will be held this year.

the Soviets have withdrawn assistance from the Chinese nuclear program. The Soviets appear to have great respect for Chinese ability and talents in the scientific field. They say that the Chinese "study all the time" and that "quite a few" younger scientists "have worked hard and come up the ladder" in the last seven or eight years.

"to the best of their knowledge" no Chinese--or, for that matter, observers from any of the Communist regimes--had ever attended a satellite or major rocket launch.

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Eastern Europe: [African students in Bucharest, disturbed by the developments in Sofia, are considering approaching the Rumanians for the third time for permission to organize an All-African Student Union to promote their solidarity and to represent their interests, according to a Cameroon student there.]

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[ ] that African students in Bucharest have encountered problems similar to those experienced by the students in Sofia. A Kenyan student informed officers of the US Embassy in Moscow several days ago that African students there were closely following the Bulgarian developments, which they consider "extremely disturbing."]

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Yugoslavia: Tito's trip to Latin America has been postponed from late this spring until fall or possibly early 1964. A Yugoslav official has implied that Tito is delaying acceptance of an invitation to visit Cuba in the hope that the most-favored-nation issue may be resolved favorably and Tito invited to visit the US.

\*Indonesia-UAR: Indonesia wants to sell three squadrons of MIG-17 jet fighters to the UAR, which is apparently not interested in the deal.

Indonesia is in financial difficulty and cannot meet Soviet demands for immediate payment on some of its debts. Both Indonesia and the UAR have the more advanced MIG-21.

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